This paper examines a key concept of democratic experimentalism, asking what is a "democratic experiment"? Starting with Donald Campbell's argument in favor of an experimenting society, the paper critically examines whether randomized controlled experiments should be the gold standard for democratic experimentalism. This tradition of experimentalism, it is argued, values the verification of knowledge above other experimental values. In this sense, it differs quite dramatically with the tradition of democratic experimentalism, which has little to say about verification. The paper then suggests that a more compatible conception of experimentalism might be found in recent work on design experiments. Design experiments lack the ambition of the verificationist paradigm to fully control variables, substituting instead a desire to iteratively improve design through real world application. The paper then goes on to examine the meaning of experimentation in the Pragmatist tradition. While some elements of the verificationist paradigm can be found in the writing of Charles Peirce, Dewey's treatment of experimentalism as a basis for modern democratic authority adopts a more general interpretation of experimentation as a form of cooperative inquiry. The final section of the paper examines the meaning and application of experimentalism in the area of adaptive management, a popular and well-studied approach to natural resource management. This analysis finds many of the same tensions in practice as described in 1 The reflections in this essay were prompted by conversations with Gerry Berk, though he cannot be held responsible for the positions that I ultimately take. theory, particularly between "experimental" and "collaborative" forms of adaptive management. These tensions point to the challenges of making experiments democratic.
theory, particularly between "experimental" and "collaborative" forms of adaptive management. These tensions point to the challenges of making experiments democratic.
I. Introduction
Pragmatist philosophy holds experimentation in high esteem. Experimentation is a leitmotif that captures, in a single stroke, the Pragmatist commitment to fallibilism, to active learning through discovery and experience, and to the iterative growth of knowledge. It is not surprising then that recent work in the Pragmatist-inspired social sciences places this leitmotif at the center of their analysis. Under the banner of "democratic experimentalism," social scientists have identified and explored the possibilities of new forms of political practice. But as a richly evocative concept, "democratic experimentalism" also carries with it the intellectual baggage associated with the concept "experiment." In this paper, I will examine this intellectual baggage, taking the idea of "experiment" and "experimentalism" seriously. To do this requires that we examine a number of issues. First, in what sense is the language of experiment and experimentation, derived from the laboratory, useful and appropriate when applied to the social world? Second, what is the meaning of "experiment" when we apply the adjective "democratic" to it? How can a technique designed to isolate the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable be said to be "democratic"? If we are to take the concept of democratic experimentalism seriously, I will argue, we must directly confront these issues.
I think it is fair to say that the literature on democratic experimentalism has taken the idea of experimentalism more in its connotative than in its denotative sense. In the classic article on democratic experimentalism by Dorf and Sabel (1998) , experimentalism has a general connotation implied by the key governance processes outlined in their paper--benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and learning by monitoring. Although never explicitly defined, we can infer from these processes that experimentalism refers broadly to a process of learning from the experience of others. Similarly, in a more recent article applying the concept of democratic experimentalism to EU governance, Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) identify four key features of experimentalist governance: 1) framework goals and measures established through joint deliberation between member states and the EU; 2) lower-level units with the autonomy to address these framework goals and measures as they see fit; 3) regular reporting by lower-level units on their progress in meeting framework goals and measures; and 4) periodic revision of framework goals and measures. Again, the authors do not focus in a literal way on the meaning of experimentalism, but we can infer from their description that experimentation refers to the iterative efforts of lower-level units to devise strategies for meeting framework goals, followed by information pooling about the results of those efforts.
It may be something akin to a category error to literally scrutinize a concept like "experimentation" if it is only being used in a connotative way. But treating the concepts of experiment and experimentalism somewhat literally raises a number of important issues for Pragmatism in general and for democratic experimentalism in particular. When applied to society and to politics, experimentalism resurrects long-standing issues about rationality and the relationship between science and politics. Does democratic experimentalism assume a kind of scientific rationality to the democratic process, a rationality often viewed cynically by the social sciences? Does experimentalism actually contribute to a logic of technocratic governance that strengthens the role of experts rather than the democratic process? What problems do social experiments face in actual practice?
Clearly, the democratic process throws up many challenges to the idea of a randomized controlled experiment. But perhaps our Pragmatist concept of experimentalism cannot and should not mimic the standard of the laboratory.
We can begin to explore these issues by first returning to an older debate about the "experimenting society."
II. The Experimenting Society
At the end of the 1960s, an eminent psychologist, Donald Campbell wrote a now classic article, "Reforms as Experiments," that argued that social reforms ought to be treated as experiments (Campbell 1969 ). Campbell argued that most social policies were introduced by "…advocates as though they were certain to be successful" (1969, 2) . As a result, society was unable to actually learn from social reforms and hence was unable, over the longer term, to design more effective policy interventions. Campbell was explicit that the gold standard of experimentation was the randomized controlled experiment, but he also clearly recognized that social reforms rarely afforded the opportunity for such designs. However, he felt that we might still achieve "quasiexperimental designs," arguing that "We must do the best we can with what is available to us" (1969, 4) . His work coincided with what Oakley has called the "Golden Age of Experimentation" in U.S. social policy (Oakley 1999) . She argues that between the 1960s and the 1980s, U.S. social policy successfully used randomized controlled experiments to test a variety of social programs.
Campbell was hard-headed in his assessment of the conditions that allowed for even quasi-experimental designs, identifying an "inventory of threats" to experimental validity (1969, 3) . While hard-headed about the possible threats to experimental validity, he remained optimistic (or perhaps stoic) about the potential for experimental policymaking. Campbell acknowledged the vulnerability of experimentation to a politics of denial, noting that: "In the present political climate, reformers and administrators achieve their precarious permission to innovate by overpromising the certain efficacy of their new programs. This traps them so that they cannot afford to risk learning that the programs were not effective" (1970, 111) . His concerns were perhaps well-founded, because despite the experimental successes identified by Oakley, the larger movement toward social experimentation often proved disappointing (Berk et al. 1985 ).
Campbell's provocative argument for an "experimenting society" prompted a number of responses, both positive and negative, and led other scholars to examine the possibilities and limits of his argument. 3 Weiss and Rein, for example, argued that "broad-aim" programs-programs "which hope to achieve non-specific forms of changefor-the-better, and which also, because of their ambition and magnitude, involve unstandardized, large-scale interventions"-are extremely difficult to evaluate experimentally (1970, 97) . They argued that it is difficult to identify satisfactory evaluation criteria for broad-aim programs and the information that an experimental design produces is limited (negative or positive results on limited criteria). To these critiques, Campbell (1970) responded that experimental designs should be based on multiple measures and multiple modes of measurement. He also argued that the problem of less-than-perfect control groups could be addressed by using a "rival hypotheses" approach, pointing out that even an imperfect control group may help to adjudicate between alternative hypotheses. Later, a model of "realist evaluation" was developed that follows in the Campbell tradition, but is explicitly designed for the evaluation of complex interventions (Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, and Walshe 2005) .
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In a sympathetic critique, Dunn embraced experimentalism, but sought to separate it what he regarded as its unfortunate association with positivism. He argued that social reformers, of various stripes, do not share standards of appraisal or the incentive structure to suspend judgment that are characteristic of a community of experimenters (1982, 299) .
Consequently, differences in underlying standards of appraisal are usually the "most decisive" issue in contested knowledge claims, rather than evidence or data (1982, 314) .
While acknowledging that Campbell had a "realist" rather than a "positivist" epistemology, Dunn (1982) argued that the idea of social experimentation was burdened by its association with positivist science (1982, 295).
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As suggested by Dunn's argumentation framework, one alternative is to move away from a laboratory or even a quasi-experimental conception of experimentation. For example, Gross contrasts the Pragmatist social reformer Jane Addams's view of experimentation with Campbell's:
Thus, he argued that the most important threats to the validity of social experiments were not the "first-order" threats identified by Campbell, but rather "second-order" threats related to the "appropriateness of problem definitions" (1982, 300) . Based on this understanding, he proposed to place the justification for social experiments in a framework that acknowledged that social experiments were "symbolically-mediated." He suggested the philosopher Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation as a framework for debating social reforms and proposed the metaphor of jurisprudence, in particular, as the way in which knowledge claims could be adjudicated in a symbolically-mediated setting. The value of this approach, Dunn claimed, was that it surfaced the assumptions driving competing knowledge claims. In a response to Dunn, Campbell accepted that "experiments are arguments," but also emphasized that experimentation was "a continuing iterative process, a self-conscious tentativeness precluding pretenses to having achieved finalization" (1982, 332 (Gross 2009, 90) .
But not all Pragmatists would agree that the standards of scientific experimentalism should be so relaxed. In a discussion of Pragmatist experimentation in ethics, Weber argues that it is "important to distinguish true experimentalism from the simple idea that we often try things in ethics and public policy" (Weber 2011, 100 proposes a natural selection model that promotes positive evolution by increasing the "variation" in the policy gene pool.
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Yet I think we can accept here that we still lack a positive conception of 6 Implicit in the logic of experimentalist governance, I believe, is the assumption that local experiments minimize the costs of a trial, while information pooling maximizes the learning benefits that arise from the conduct of these trials.
Design experiments, they argue, differ significantly from randomized controlled experiments. Design experimentation starts with the presumption that the world is a messy place and that experiments will not be able to isolate the effect of single variables. In a design experiment, the experimenter presumes that the experiment will interact with the totality of the setting in which the experiment is conducted. The focus of a design experiment is not to definitively accept or reject a hypothesis, but rather to iteratively refine the intervention (design-redesign cycles). Research questions are updated as the intervention unfolds (as opposed to each intervention being a single test). The ultimate purpose is not to test general theory, but to probe the possibilities and limits of the intervention. Design experiments do not create a sharp distinction between researchers and subjects; instead, the practitioners often become experimenters. 8 While the design experiment differs from a randomized controlled experiment, it does share with this research tradition the need to explicitly pose and evaluate research question guided by both theoretical and practical concerns. Since the democratic experimentalism literature has not been very explicit about the meaning it attributes to the concept of "experiment," I want to suggest that it is more compatible with design experiments than with randomized controlled experiments or even quasi-experiments. Clearly, democratic experimentalism envisions experiments as being conducted in the messy real world. They talk little of controlling experimental conditions and express little concern about verification. The interventions they are concerned about are typically institutional and they are clearly very interested in the iterative refinement of designs. I would argue that this design experiment perspective is also compatible with the Darwinian view of increasing variation-a point that can be interpreted as increasing the number of design options available. However, this design experiment perspective may be in some tension with democratic experimentalism's benchmarking strategy. From a design experiment perspective, designs are introduced into a concrete social context and then coevolve with that context. This does not mean that nothing can be learned by comparing across contexts, but it does mean that that we must be cautious about transferring experimental results from one context to another. It also means that we should be cautious about any tendency to identify a "best design."
Designs are contingent upon context.
The design science approach to experimentalism, of course, has its own limitations. But it comes closest to what I argued, in my previous work, characterized a Pragmatist approach to experimentation. There, I suggested that Pragmatism departs from a positivist view of experimentation by emphasizing the "provisional, probative, creative, and jointly constructed character of social experimentation" (Ansell 2011, 12) .
Design approaches are interested in causality, but conclusions are likely to be more provisional than are the conclusions of laboratory experiments. By exploring the impact of a design in a real, messy context, design approaches will investigate the multiple pathways of causation and will attempt to relate causation to a wider sent of interrelated factors than will a laboratory experiment. Thus, a design approach will investigate these causal pathways in a more probative fashion than laboratory experiments. The iterative redesign of design experiments makes the experimental process more creative than a single shot laboratory test. Finally, by breaking down the boundaries between researchers, practitioners, and subjects, the design approach embraces the jointly constructed character of experimentation.
To defend, refine, and elaborate this position, I want to examine more closely the legacy of Pragmatist thinking about experimentation. I find that it is a more complex and ambiguous narrative than I had earlier recognized.
III. Pragmatist Philosophy, Experimentalism, and Democracy
Few would dispute the claim that experimentalism is an important Pragmatist theme. Yet the precise position of Pragmatism and Pragmatists on experimentalism is surprisingly difficult to clarify, and has been the subject of many disputes. Peirce's views on experimentation are sometimes interpreted as coming close to a verificationist perspective: "removing of doubt" is central to his concept of experimentalism (Wiener 1956 ). Among the founding Pragmatists, Peirce was the closest to the natural sciences, but questions still arise as to whether he had one view of inquiry for the natural sciences and a different one for ethics (Weiner 1956; Murphree 1963 ) and the precise relationship of his thought to the positivist doctrine of verification is unsettled (Almeder 1979) .
Questions have also been raised about William James's stance towards experimentation.
He is charged, for example, with being an indifferent experimentalist (Evans 1990; Taylor 2006 ). John Dewey's work paints the broadest canvas for the idea of experimentalism, because Dewey sought to extend experimentalism beyond the scientific community to society. Notably, Dewey made the bold move of explicitly extending the idea of experimentalism from science proper to the field of ethics. His goal in doing this was to overcome the fact-value dichotomy by making ethical values, as a well as empirical facts, the subject of on-going inquiry (Norton 1999) . Deweyian experimentalism as applied to ethics.
1. an attitude of openness to learning through trial and error.
2. acceptance that persons of all backgrounds could be sources of insight about ethics.
3. agreement that inquiry through good scientific methods will be taken seriously in judging the outcomes of experiments.
4. recognition that there is a creative element in hypothesis formation or the framing of problems to be examine and tested, which will always include implications and potential for unwanted bias.
5. realization of the limits of human knowledge, both in terms of empirical fact and in terms of moral experimental design.
6. preparedness to draw on the valuable tool of various moral consideration without seeing a singular theory as required to accept exclusively 7. acknowledgement of the expansive progression for moral consideration beyond the limits of what previous generations respected morally (Weber 2011, 104) .
We can see some affinity here with the features of Pragmatist experimentation I identified in my earlier work: experimentation is provisional (openness to learning; realization of limits of human knowledge; expansive progression beyond the expectations of previous generations), probative (preparedness to use various moral considerations without seeing a singular theory), creative (creative element in hypothesis formation), and jointly defined (acceptance that all persons are sources of insight).
This perspective points to the way that experimentalism is embedded in a wider notion of inquiry. David Hildebrand argues that four aspects of Pragmatist inquiry are critical:
terms of usefulness: A proposition may be said to be verified if it serves as a useful guide to future conduct" (1999, 545 Waks (1998) points out that Dewey's experimentalism answered a search to find a basis of modern authority (after religion had lost this role). For Dewey, science created an inquirying attitude that Dewey believed could provide the basis for a reconciliation of freedom and authority (Haworth 1960) . Like the idea of experimentation embraced by Jane Addams (Dewey's close collaborator), he understood this authority as arising from the experience of people.
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The relationship between experimentalism and democracy is central to Dewey's work, but it is a complex and often subtle relationship. Bohman (1999) argues that It is not so much science per se that provides this authority (e.g., via the verified truth provided by experiment), but rather the action of inquiry itself.
Following Hildebrand, we might say that authority is created when the process of inquiry has become dynamic, provisional, self-correcting, and social.
Pragmatism pushes in two directions: toward making democracy more like science (more like a form of cooperative inquiry); but also toward democratizing science (toward making the basic techniques of science accessible to all citizens). 12 Waks writes that for
Dewey "Experimentalism was a framework for a unified cultural and educational project.
The goals was to place in the hands of ordinary people the tools to undermine socially problematic forms of science and technology" (1997, 18 "Democracy is a way of life that empowers communities (and individuals) to express and secure their values by engaging in the epistemic process of social or public inquiry. Pragmatic objectivity is a virtue exemplified by inquiries with processes that are accessible, transparent, and amenable to challenge or revision. Democracy and objectivity are mutually supporting because (a) objectivity is an epistemic virtue made possible by the conditions of democracy, and (b) a democracy can survive and sustain these conditions only when its citizens seek objectivity in their inquiries (and maintain institutions, like schools or public-minded journalism, that nurture the prerequisite capacities for inquiry) (2011, 596). 13 Morris (1999) , for example, argues that although Dewey embraced science, he was a "postpositivist" (as opposed to a postmodernist) who emphasized the role of science in discovery.
democratizing. Her view of experiment was the idea of making knowledge useful for everyday life, and in particular, a life of self-government. From her perspective, an experiment "…has to be initiated by the people themselves" (Gross 2009, 87 (Gross 2009, 87) .
In a democracy, however, people have the right to ignore evidence (Sanderson 2009 ).
Hildebrand argues that the Achilles heel of the experimentalist view is that it excludes those who do not share, in the first place, the experimentalist view (e.g., those who do not believe that norms are subject to inquiry…). Moreover, the idea of extending experimentalism to democracy assumes that citizens do not have to be trained scientists to successfully conduct experiments. Dewey, in particular, stresses not only that the mind, in its attempt to solve problems, is by nature experimental, but also that citizens are capable of learning to be citizen-scientists. 14 14 MacGilvray argues that "Because experimental intelligence is a tool of all sentient creatures, there is no reason in principle to think that the experimental attitude could not be adopted by any particular individual toward and given set of social arrangements or institutions." Furthermore, "Because experimental inquiry has had enormous success in securing human goods, we should ceteris paribus expect greater good to be achieved through its extension into new areas of endeavor. The experimental approach to experience is therefore fundamentally egalitarian-all may reasonably be expected to adopt it and profit thereby" (551-2).
It should be remembered that Dewey's idea of experimentalism arose, in part, out of his work in education. His emphasis on democratic experimentalism was really about extending the culture of experimentation to everyday practice (Hlebowitsh 2006) .
Bringing together the debate about Campbell's "experimenting society" with this discussion of Dewey's attempt to democratize experimentation, we see a number of differences in emphasis. First, Campbell's notion of experimentation is dedicated to improving public policy by subjecting public policy experiments to greater evaluation. In seeking to use experimentation to verify the efficacy of social reforms, he runs in to the significant social and political challenges of constructing even "quasi-experimental" tests of efficacy. Dewey extends his notion of experimentation to democratic society, which is dedicated to cultivating a new basis for democratic authority. For Dewey, applying the idea of experimentation to democratic society is about deepening the ability of citizens to engage in open inquiry, both individually and collectively. As applied to democratic society, his model places greater emphasis on educating citizens to engage in open inquiry than it does on the specific features of verification. I would suggest that this does not preclude a concern about verification, but the emphasis is place on promoting inquiry.
The contemporary literature on democratic experimentalism stands somewhere between these two contrasting descriptions. As described earlier, the democratic experimentalist ideas of benchmarking and information pooling sounds more like Campbell than Dewey. However, like Dewey, democratic experimentalism stresses more of an open model of inquiry than it does a specifically verificationist notion of experiment. The "democratic" adjective in democratic experimentalism seems to arise from the freedom of many different lower level units to experiment with different policies.
In the next section, I will examine some of the issues raised in the last two section as they apply to a concrete form of experimentalism-adaptive resource management. A significant body of work has developed around adaptive management, allowing us to deepen our interrogation of the meaning of experimentation and its practical implementation.
IV. An Experiment in Experimentation: Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is envisioned as a form of experimentalism designed to test and improve natural resource management regimes (Walters and Hollings 1990; Karkkainen 2003) . It is a notable version of a wider movement in policy studies to regard policy implementation as an iterative, experimental process (Eppel, Turner, and Wolf 2011) .
Norton describes the relationship between adaptive management and experimentalism:
Adaptive managers believe that a path to sustainability cannot be charted by choosing a fixed goal or set rules at the start. We must start where we are; but we do have the ability to engage in experiments to reduce the uncertainty and to refine goals through iterative discussions among stakeholders. Environmental management must be a process in which managers choose actions that serve as experiments with the capacity to reduce uncertainty and to refine goals through iterative discussions among stakeholders (1999, 459) .
15 Lee (1993) and Karkkainen (2003) argue that adaptive management is consistent with Dewey's experimentalism. (Susskind, Camacho, and Schenk. 2012 ).
Adaptive management is very attractive to resource managers and its popularity continues to grow. While there have been a number of adaptive management successes are (thought to be) extraneous to the hypothesis, and opportunities to replicate the experiment to check its reliability. These guide the selection of treatments applied to test hypotheses, and the selection of techniques that define what is being controlled and which measurements are replicated. Hypothesis, controls, and replicates are all import to reliable knowledge but none is easily achieved in conservation practice." 16 However, different approaches to adaptive management may place more or less emphasis on its experimental aspects. In an analysis of the adaptive management literature, McFadden, Hiller, and Tyre (2011) suggest that a "decision-theoretic" approach makes experimentation less central than does a "resilience-experimentation" approach. (Lee 1999 ) the overall results have been somewhat disappointing (Allen and Gunderson 2011; Walters 2007) . In the cases of large-scale ecosystem management that she studied,
Layzer found a number of factors have discouraged learning from adaptive management, including the: "inability to agree on a baseline level of environmental protection; reluctance to allot money for monitoring, unwillingness to create institutions that can coordinate collection and analysis of data across jurisdictions and agencies, and political constraints on adjusting policies and practices" (2008, 280) .
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One of the signs of the maturing of the adaptive management field is the attempt to specify the conditions under which adaptive management is more or less likely to work.
Gregory, Ohlson, and Arvai (2006) offer four criteria for deciding whether adaptive management is a feasible strategy. They suggest that resource managers need to first think about the geographic and temporal scale of the management problem. Can managers afford to wait for the results of the experiment and can an experiment be Farrelly and Brown (2011) find that local water managers in Australia were enthusiastic about experimenting with different forms of water management, but that these experiments were often constrained by the larger water regimes in which they are embedded. In the Everglades, experimentation was prevented by interest groups who would have been affected by the experiments (Gunderson and Light 2006) . Legal frameworks and the courts also come into conflict with adaptive management strategies (Ruhl and Fishman 2010; Thrower 2006 ). Walters (2007) argues that the most important factor in the failure of adaptive management programs in fisheries has been the lack of leadership to carry adaptive programs through a complex administrative process. 17 In terms of persuading courts of the legitimacy of adaptive management, however, Ruhl and Fishman (2010) note that agencies fare better in large-scale management regimes than in small-scale regimes.
conducted at the geographical scale called for? 18 Walters and Hollings (1990) distinguish three approaches to adaptive management for large-scale natural resource management.
Second, resource managers need to consider how the adaptive management regime will interact with uncertainty. Will experimental findings be valid even in the face of uncontrolled events? Third, are the cost and benefits of the experiment relatively well-defined at the outset and will the results of the experiment have clear benefits? Finally, are stakeholders committed to an experimental approach and is there sufficient leadership and skill to carry the experimental approach through to completion? Depending on how these questions are answered, adaptive management may be a more or less promising approach. A similar argument is put forward by Allan and Gunderson (2011) , who suggest that adaptive management is most appropriate where uncertainty is high, but where controllability of the resource is high and risk of negative consequences is relatively low.
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18 Walter and Hollings note that "Management experimentation is often meaningless in settings where no value is placed on the long-term utility of experimental results " (1990, 2062) .
The first is trial and error learning, which begins with more arbitrary policy choices, but then incrementally improves policy design over time. The second is a "passive adaptive" approach, which uses historical evidence to construct a "best strategy." They call the third approach "active adaptive,' which they argue balances the goals of adopting the strategy that is expected to yield the best short term performance results with a longer-term goal of identifying the correct model of the ecosystem. They argue that passive adaptive approaches often lead to scientific contestation (the "battle of models") that cannot really be adjudicated.
It is useful to compare these different approaches to adaptive management with our earlier discussion of "decision experiments." Both decision experiments and adaptive management experiments take place in messy real-world contexts. Since decision experiments are largely concerned with iteratively improving a particular design, they probably come closest in spirit to what Walters and Holling call "trail and error learning."
The adaptive management community, however, is somewhat dismissive of these less ambitious forms of learning.
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While many managers claim to be practicing adaptive management, most practice some form of trial and error management or management by objective with updating. That is, social objectives are determined, management actions are structured to attain those objectives, then progress towards those objectives is evaluated, and actions modified as needed to meet objectives. One key distinction between these approaches is that adaptive management assumes policy failures will occur and that they provide a valuable contribution for learning, while other approaches seek to avoid policy failure. Avoiding failures only acts to reinforce the status quo and precludes opportunities for learning while doing (2006, 327) .
As Gunderson and Light argue:
Given the fact that more ambitious adaptive management strategies have generally been disappointing, perhaps this community might want to reassess the value of trial and error learning as a form of design experiment?
We find tensions in adaptive management analogous to the tension between
Campbell's verificationist model and the more social model of experimentalism advanced 20 Ruhl and Fishman argue that "From theory to policy to practice, at each step forward in the emergence of adaptive management something has been lost in the translation. The end product is something we call 'a/m lite,' a watered-down version of the theory that resembles ad hoc contingency planning more than it does planned 'learning while doing '(2010, 426) .
by Jane Addams. Karkaainen (2003) Stringer et al. 2006 ). Failure to bridge this gap, however, can undermine the long-term stakeholder commitment to adaptive management. 21 The emphasis on experimentation suggests a "rational planning" model of policymaking, which has long been attacked by political scientists as ignoring politics (Hitema, Mostert, Egas, Moellenkamp, Pahl-Wostl, and Yalcin. 2009; McLain and Lee 1996) . 22 A number of studies stress the importance of developing shared understanding and shared problem definitions among stakeholders (Stringer et al. 2006) . In a study of several cases of adaptive management, McLain and Lee (1996) found that adaptive management failed to create forums for promoting shared understanding among stakeholders. In their analysis of the failures of collaboration in the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Susskind, Camacho, and Schenk argue that participants in successful collaboratives must "agree on the research questions that need to be answered and methods for addressing them" (2012, 49) . Cundill, Cumming, Biggs, and Fabricus (2011) argue for the application of soft systems thinking to adaptive management, which stresses the role of stakeholders in the emergent definition of the management problem. 23 They make an argument for building bridges between an experimental and a collaborative adaptive management: "...collaborative processes ought not to be seen as simply a 'graft' in the early phases of [experimental adaptive management]. Without stakeholder participation in data collection and interpretation, and training in the use of tools that enable knowledge models to be updated, [experimental adaptive management] risks becoming detached from those who need to learn. Furthermore, any knowledge created may remain privileged" (2009, 487) .
stresses the role of collaboration among stakeholders as a critical feature of the ability to adapt to socio-ecological change (Armitage et al. 2009 ). However, I note that the adaptive co-management literature tends to move away a specific discussion of experiments and instead stresses the generic features of learning. This literature places great value on experiential learning and also stresses how stakeholders learn from each other. This shift from learning-from-experiments to learning-in-general may be analogous to Dewey's interpretation of experimentation as an attitude toward inquiry.
Yet it is also probably true that by widening the meaning of "adaptive" to include all learning, the adaptive co-management literature tends to lose the specificity of learning from experiments.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to draw attention to what we mean when we talk about "democratic experimentalism." What is a "democratic experiment"? I raise this question because I believe that the concepts of experiment and experimentalism, when applied to democratic politics, carry significant intellectual baggage. We first associate the term "experiment" with science and with specific scientific procedures. Then we must translate the term from the laboratory to the political arena.
The first question the democratic experimentalism literature must confront is whether to treat randomized controlled experiments as the "gold standard," even though the best we can probably do in the real world is to meet "quasi-experimental" standards.
If we answer yes, then we are very much building on the earlier ideas developed by Donald Campbell in his analysis of the experimenting society. To do so has the advantage of offering a very distinctive methodology for knowledge generation.
However, the downside is that achieving controlled conditions for this kind of experimentation is extremely demanding, particularly in the political world (as Campbell well understood). At the very least, if we follow Campbell's lead, then the democratic experimentalism literature needs to give greater attention to the verification of the experiments. If we choose to move away from Campbell's framework, we avoid the demanding standards of experimental control, but we also lose some of the knowledge verification that comes with this control.
I argued that if we want to treat experimentalism as a particular political and epistemic methodology, but do not want to be held to the gold standard of randomized controlled experiments, then one alternative is the framework offered by design science.
A design experiment "tests" a design by introducing it into a real world situation and then closely follows its interaction with this context. As feedback about the design becomes available, the design is iteratively redesigned. The design science framework moves away from hypothesis testing under controlled conditions and instead focuses on generating richer observations about the wider set of interactions between the design and its context. Clearly, this approach to experimentation loses the powerful mode of verification associated with controlled experimentation (and for this reason, some might argue that it is not experimental at all). But it gains in at least two ways. First, it drops the pretense of being able to fully control social variables. Second, design experiments break down the barriers between researchers and research subjects, opening up wider opportunities for a "democratic" experimentalism. Finally, I investigated a concrete case of experimentalism-the adaptive management of natural resources. The purpose of this investigation was to explore these general issues in a concrete empirical case. Adaptive management was selected because it explicitly embraces experimentation in natural resource governance and because an extensive literature now reports on these experimental efforts. I found that the tensions around the meaning of experimentation also appear in this literature. However, since this is a movement dominated by scientists, it is not surprising that the notion of experimentation largely conforms to the verificationist model advanced by Campbell.
We also see from the reviews of this field that the experimental model has not fared well in everyday implementation. While it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about whether these implementation failures relate directly to this model of experimentation, I
feel it is legitimate to at least raise the issue. As the first section of the paper concluded, a verificationist model of experiment erects high barriers to successful implementation. I raise the possibility that a design science approach might fare better. I also point to the possibility that shifting toward a more general learning orientation-much as Dewey does--might deepen the democratic basis of adaptive management. Such moves would likely encounter the resistance of scientists devoted to a verificationist understanding of experiment. But these tensions are precisely the intellectual baggage that a democratic experimentalist movement must confront.
